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What shapes the generosity of short- and long-term benefits? 
A political economy approach 
Baptiste Françon1 and Michaël Zemmour2 
Abstract : Degressivity of unemployment benefits is a major feature of social protection in most 
industrialised countries: the replacement rate (the ratio between the level of welfare benefits and the 
previous income) typically declines with the length of the unemployment spell. Moreover degressivity 
of unemployment benefits has significant distributive effects as the risk of long-term unemployment 
varies from one individual to another. This paper proposes a formal model of political support for 
unemployment insurance that takes into account the decrease in the level of benefits over time. A 
discount factor is introduced that diminishes the level of benefits for long-term unemployed. The main 
predictions of our model are the following: i) Unemployment insurance size negatively depends on 
both the average level and the heterogeneity of unemployment risk ii) The degressivity increases with 
the average level and the heterogeneity in the individual level of employability defined as the 
probability of finding a job when unemployed. These predictions are then tested using a dataset of 24 
OECD countries. Empirical results are consistent with the model. 
Economie politique de l'assurance chômage : quels déterminants de la générosité des 
prestations de courte et de longue durée ? 
Résumé :Le caractère dégressif de l'assurance chômage est un trait commun de nombreux pays 
industrialisés: le taux de remplacement décline au cours de la période de chômage. De plus, le degré 
de dégressivité a des conséquences distributives importantes dans la mesure où le risque de chômage 
de longue durée n'est pas uniforme. Cet article propose un modèle d'économie politique dans lequel la 
demande d'assurance chômage prend en compte la distinction entre chômage de courte et de longue 
durée et la possibilité de prestations dégressives. Les principales prédictions du modèle sont les 
suivantes : i) le taux de remplacement moyen des prestations chômage dépend négativement du 
chômage moyen et de l'hétérogénéité du risque de chômage dans la population. ii) La  dégressivité des 
prestations est d'autant plus forte que l'employabilité moyenne est plus faible et que le niveau 
d'employabilité des salariés est hétérogène. Ces prédictions sont testées sur des données OCDE 
concernant 24 pays. Les résultats obtenus sont cohérents avec le modèle. 
Keywords: long-term unemployment, political economy, replacement rate, risk heterogeneity, 
unemployment insurance, voting behaviour. 
 
Mot-clés: assurance chômage, chômage de longue durée, comportement de vote, économie 
politique, hétérogénéité du risque, taux de remplacement. 
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1. Introduction  
Scholars who address the political determinants and the economic effects of social insurance 
in a comparative perspective generally focus on its overall generosity, measured in terms of 
total expenditures or of replacement rates. However, an equivalent amount of social insurance 
does not necessarily imply the same repartition of benefits among welfare recipients, as the 
rules according to which benefits are calculated may vary from one country to another. For 
instance, social insurance regimes differ in their definition of eligibility requirements in terms 
of past contributions, or in the reference that is used to compute the level of benefits (last paid 
wage or wage averaged on a broader period). Since the definition of these parameters entails 
significant distributive effects, one should expect the social insurance design to be a source of 
political conflict among citizens, which cannot be mistaken for a pure “technical” issue. 
Moreover, the alignment of workers' interest toward these parameters might differ from the 
one relative to the size of social insurance. 
In this paper, we are interested in the political preferences for unemployment benefits 
degressivity, where degressivity measures the extent to which the level of benefits decreases 
with the length of the unemployment spell. As such, degressivity is a prominent and 
conflicting feature of the unemployment insurance (UI) design: while it determines the share 
of benefits dedicated to short- and long-term unemployed respectively, the rate at which the 
level of benefits declines over the unemployment spell varies a lot across countries and 
welfare regimes, and long-term benefits amount to a significant share of total UI expenditures 
in some countries. Moreover, we argue that the political economy of degressivity has a 
different, and partly autonomous, logic from the one that governs the determination of the 
overall degree of UI generosity. 
The importance of analysing UI degressivity as an independent object is justified by the 
recent trend of reforms in industrialised countries. Those reforms were characterised by the 
revision of the calculation rule for unemployment benefits rather than full liberalisation, a 
pattern particularly salient in continental Europe since the 1990s (Clegg, 2007). Typically, 
they have consisted in cutting or shortening long-term unemployment benefits, while 
compensation for short-term unemployed was broadly maintained at the same level. In 
practice, revision of the calculation rule for benefits took the form of a gradual decline in their 
level with the duration of the unemployment spell (e.g. France 1979 and 1992, Sweden 2008) 
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or, more drastically, a reduction in the duration of compensation (Germany 2005, Denmark 
2006). 
In summary, while this path of reforms implied a fall in the overall generosity of UI schemes 
in many countries, the impact on degressivity was far more pronounced.3 Labour economists 
who investigate the effects of benefits duration (Meyer, 1990; Hunt, 1995) or gradual decline 
in compensation (Van der Berg, 1990) on the exit rate from unemployment generally put 
forward the disincentive effects associated with generous long-term benefits. From this point 
of view, the recent wave of reforms could be analysed as a trend toward an efficient UI 
design. However, this type of explanation is not satisfying, as it does not account for why 
long-term arrangements for unemployed emerged in the first place. The political economy 
approach endorsed in this paper emphasises the role of political support - at the country level -
in determining on one hand the level of UI generosity and on the other hand the level of 
degressivity. In this framework, this type of parametric reform was carried out because it was 
politically less costly to implement than across-the-board cuts, suggesting that the interests at 
stake were not the same.  
In most OECD countries the public scheme for UI is mandatory, or equivalently has a very 
high level of coverage. Among social protection schemes, UI is probably the closest to the 
ideal type of a “Bismarckian” social insurance. Indeed, it is funded through social 
contributions proportional to wages and distributes benefits related to previous earnings. Its 
main purpose thus serves to socialise risks, maintaining the income level in case of job losses. 
While UI has therefore a relatively weak impact on redistribution across different classes of 
incomes, there is still redistribution taking place from people with a low unemployment risk 
toward those more exposed (Wright, 1986; Sinn, 1995). This implies that the unemployment 
risk is a prominent determinant of individuals’ preferences for UI generosity.  Hence, recent 
contributions from the political economy literature have highlighted the impact of risk 
distribution on the size of social protection (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Kim, 2007; Rehm, 
2011). 
Drawing on this literature, the originality of this paper is to propose a simple model where 
compensation is no longer uniform over time. Our main argument is that the degressivity of 
benefits is a core parameter of the UI and that it may have major political and distributional 
                                                 
3 Note that we adopt a broad definition for degressivity that also includes reduction in compensation duration. In 
our model, this corresponds to the extreme case where benefits are set to zero for long-term unemployed. 
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effects. This model distinguishes between two stages of unemployment, short and long-term, 
and accordingly two levels of benefits. Agents vote over the global envelop of resources 
dedicated to unemployment compensation and also over a degressivity parameter that settles 
how benefits will decline with the length of the unemployment spell. While the existing 
literature generally acknowledges that unemployment risk combines the risk of job loss and 
the risk of staying unemployed4 (i.e. lack of employability), this distinction does not play a 
role in the determination of the political equilibrium. On the contrary, we claim that job loss 
risk and employability will affect differently the UI design since these two features are not 
distributed similarly among workers. The main predictions of our model are the following: i) 
UI size negatively depends on both the average level and the heterogeneity of unemployment 
risk ii) The degressivity increases with the average level and the heterogeneity in the 
individual level of employability. 
This paper is organised as follows. Next section displays descriptive statistics on UI 
degressive design in OECD countries. Third section provides a brief review of the literature 
dealing with the political economy of social protection. Section 4 details the model and its 
main predictions. Section 5 presents some empirical evidence in line with the theoretical 
results. Last section concludes. 
 
2. Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we present descriptive statistics about short- and long-term unemployment 
benefits5 and the characteristics of unemployment by country.6  
Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between the average replacement rates of short- and long-
term benefits, where long-term is defined as spells of unemployment longer than a year. 
Countries in blue have earnings-related benefits (Bismarckian), while for countries in red UI 
the benefits are flat rate (Beveridgean).7  
                                                 
4 A possible third dimension would be the risk of getting a worse-paid job, but this is out of our scope. 
5 It is worth noticing that we are here talking about the unemployment insurance system, excluding all types of 
minimal income and other solidarity benefits designed to fight poverty. 
6 Details about indicators can be found in Appendix 1.1. 
7 Countries may deliver flat rate benefits of different amount for short- and long-term unemployed. 
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As stated above, a large majority of countries have a Bismarckian type UI.8 Short-term 
replacement rates range from 31% (UK, where UI benefits are not earnings-related) to 85% 
(Luxembourg), with a mean around 63%. Long-term replacement rates range from 0% 
(Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Korea, Turkey provide no UI benefits after one year of unemployment)9 
to 63% (Belgium) for an average value of 22.5%. Figure 1.1 does not reveal any clear pattern 
in the relationship between short- and long-term benefits. The distinction between 
Bismarckian and Beveridgean types of UI is not very conclusive either. Finally, we observe 
that the variability across countries is more important for long- than for short-term benefits. 
                                                 
8 This distinction is based on the OECD country documentation, “Work incentives” series. 
9 Entitlement to benefits even stops earlier (after a few months) for some of these countries. 
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Figure 1.1:   Long-term and short-term UI replacement rate 
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The existence of disincentive effects would suggest that the level of long-term unemployment 
is driven by the level of long-term benefits. In Figure 1.2, we compare the long-term 
generosity of UI with the absolute level of long-term unemployment.  
Figure 1.2:  Long-term replacement rate and long-term unemployment 
 
There is no clear pattern emerging from this figure. If anything, higher long-term 
unemployment is generally associated with smaller long-term benefits. This implies that 
higher long-term benefits do not have strong disincentive effects. It rather suggests that high 
rates of long-term unemployment enhance the political and budgetary pressure to reduce long-
term benefits generosity, a feature that our model accounts for. Let us now come to the two 
dependent variables examined in this paper to capture the bi-dimensional characteristics of 
UI: the overall generosity of the system (defined as the weighted average of short- and long-
term replacement rates) and the degressivity (defined as the ratio of long-term replacement 
rate over short-term replacement rate)10. The distribution of these variables across countries is 
displayed in Figure 1.3. At first sight, one sees that there is strong variability in both 
dimensions, while again there is no clear relation between them. The ranking of countries 
according to our overall generosity index is in line with usual typology from the welfare state 
literature. Besides, the degressivity index especially exhibits strong variability among 
                                                 
10 The construction of these variables is detailed in section 5 and in Appendix 1.1. 
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countries with a medium to high level of generosity. On the contrary, countries with a low 
level of generosity generally have a very degressive UI, UK being an exception. In this paper, 
our purpose is to determine what political economy determinants shape these two dimensions. 
Figure 1.3:  Degressivity index and overall generosity index 
 
Note: The overall generosity index expresses the average replacement rate. Degressivity index takes value 1 for a 
non-degressive system and 0 if there is no long-term benefit at all. Value below 0 indicates that UI benefits stop 
before the end of the first year of unemployment. 
 
Eventually, two additional remarks can be made. First, countries with very similar 
unemployment characteristics (average unemployment and share of long term unemployment) 
may have very different degressivity indexes. This is for instance the case of Denmark and 
Sweden or of Germany and Belgium (Table 1.1). Second, a quick estimation of the cost of 
long-term benefits reveals that the level of degressivity adopted by a country may have a 
strong financial impact, even in countries where the share of long-term unemployment is 
relatively small: for instance Denmark spends 15% of its UI expenditure to compensate long-
term unemployed, whereas Sweden only spends 8%; Germany also dedicates less resources 
for long-term unemployment compensation than Belgium (43% against 48%), while having a 
slightly larger share of long-term unemployment. These figures make obvious that the relative 
generosity of long term benefit can be a major political issue (beside incentives or value 
judgments concerns): a significant social transfer is at stake, not only between employed and 
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unemployed workers, but also between unemployed depending on their expected duration of 
unemployment. 
Table 1.1 : Share of LT benefits in total UI expenditures (our estimation) 
  
Total 
unemployment rate 
Share of long term 
unemployment in total 
unemployment 
Degressivity 
index 
Share of LT benefits in 
total UI expenditures 
(rough estimation11) 
Denmark 4.6 18.7 73.9 15% 
Sweden 5.3 16.8 45.7 8% 
Germany 9.1 51.1 73.3 43% 
Belgium 7.7 48.9 96.3 48% 
Source: our estimation, based on OECD data, see appendix 1.1 for details on variables 
 
3. Literature 
There is a large political economy literature exploring the determinants of political support for 
economic policies (Meltzer and Richard, 1981, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Saint-Paul, 
2000). Building on this literature, we endorse the view under which the size and scope of 
public UI reflect (at least at some point) the political preferences of citizens. Such an 
assumption is realistic in democratic countries, even if citizens do not directly vote on these 
particular issues. Indeed, political actors (political parties, unions…) who shape UI have 
strong incentives to take into account the preferences of their constituencies if they want to 
stay in power. Furthermore, we share with the political economy literature the assumption 
under which individuals’ political behaviour (e.g. voting) is fundamentally motivated by their 
self-interest, i.e. the gains or losses they expect from a particular economic policy. 
Heterogeneity of political preferences then arises from differences in people’s socio-economic 
position. In this view our paper departs from a social planner’s perspective. We are interested 
in political decisions that are actually taken and not in the ones that would maximise macro-
economic outcomes12. 
                                                 
11 We use the following formula: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝐼 = 𝐿𝑇 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡∗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑆𝑇 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡∗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑇 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝐿𝑇 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡∗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑇 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
12 A number of papers have explicitly dealt with the impact of UI generosity on the unemployment rate. 
Theoretically, one could expect unemployment benefits to create incentives distortions and to increase 
unemployment (e.g. Salanié, 2011, pp. 44-45). On the other hand, generous UI could enhance the efficiency of 
the matching process and thus foster employment stability (Acemoglu, 2001; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). 
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The seminal contribution by Meltzer and Richard (1981) addresses the determinants of 
preferences for redistribution policies. In this framework, redistribution takes place through 
the form of a lump-sum transfer paid to all agents, while this transfer is financed through a tax 
proportional to earnings. Some agents may choose not to work because of disincentive effects 
induced by redistribution. An important implication of the model is that only individuals with 
below-average productivity will support redistribution, as their gain from the transfer 
outweighs the cost of the taxes they pay; a realistic right-skewed income distribution then 
implies that the decisive median voter should have below-average productivity and then 
support some redistribution.  
Subsequent contributions have introduced a useful distinction between vertical and horizontal 
redistribution (Wright, 1986, Sinn, 1995).  Indeed, significant amounts of social transfers are 
in fact devoted to public provisions against risks of income losses (illness, unemployment or 
pensions). Social protection thus acts as a risk-pooling device that performs horizontal 
redistribution from low-risk workers towards high-risk workers, rather than vertical 
redistribution from low-income agents towards high-income agents. Looking at the 
preferences for UI, Wright (1986) proposes a model where unemployment is no longer the 
result of tax disincentives but of exogenous employment opportunities. Individuals are 
heterogeneous in this respect only (they earn the same wage when employed); their average 
time spent in unemployment is defined to be a function of the probability of losing their job 
and of the probability of finding a new one. Wright’s model predicts that public UI can arise 
through majority rule even in the presence of complete private markets13. 
An important prediction of the Meltzer and Richard model states that total welfare payments 
would grow with income inequality, measured by the ratio between the productivity of the 
decisive median voter and the average productivity. Empirically, the evidence for this 
prediction is weak. Instead, one would rather observe the inverse relation in industrialised 
countries (Bénabou, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). An important strand of the literature 
has been dedicated to unravel this paradox. Building on Wright’s paper, Moene and 
Wallerstein (2001) propose a model where agents not only differ in their (exogenous) 
unemployment risk but also in their income. A critical prediction of their model is that 
individuals with above-average income might support public welfare expenditures when they 
                                                                                                                                                        
Empirical evidence of detrimental effects of unemployment benefits on employment at the macroeconomic level 
remains controversial (Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Baccaro and Rei, 2007). 
13 Depending on the real interest rate. 
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are risk averse, as their insurance motive dominates their redistribution motive. As a 
consequence, they show that a decrease in the income of the median voter leads him to 
demand less welfare expenditures, and that income inequality might therefore lead to less 
redistribution. In a different framework, Iversen and Soskice (2001) make the point that risk 
aversion might differ across workers according to their skills. In particular, workers with 
specific skills (as opposed to general skills) will seek to protect their assets in the event of job 
loss, as their skills are not easily transferable from one job to another. This will lead them to 
have high preferences for generous welfare benefits. As there are less income inequalities in 
countries where the share of workers with specific skills is larger, these countries also have 
larger welfare expenditures. Hassler et al. (2002) make a similar argument to explain the 
unemployment rate and unemployment insurance levels in Europe and in the US. 
Recent contributions in political science have provided empirical evidence of the relationship 
between benefits generosity and risk heterogeneity. Rehm (2011) shows that high 
occupational unemployment risk is a strong predictor for positive attitudes towards welfare 
policies. Furthermore, he argues that social protection would develop in countries where 
unemployment risk heterogeneity is the smallest, because a political consensus will be easier 
to form on this point. Kim (2007) makes the formalised argument that the demand for 
unemployment insurance at the micro level depends on the combination of risk heterogeneity 
and wage inequality. Both authors test their argument on comparative data on unemployment 
risk by occupation. It is worth noticing however that the absolute level of unemployment is 
out of Kim's perspective and that Rehm (2011) finds the absolute level of unemployment 
insignificant in explaining unemployment insurance level. 
Our paper is very much in line with these latter works: it is also about determining the 
political determinants of the demand for unemployment insurance, and to test it using cross-
country variations. The original contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we provide a 
formal model of UI where benefits might decline with the duration of the unemployment 
spell.14 Focusing on the heterogeneity in unemployment risks rather than on incomes, we 
explore the fact that this heterogeneity is at least bi-dimensional15 since risk of job loss and 
level of employability should not be perfectly correlated. Second, we provide empirical 
evidence that risk heterogeneity is indeed a powerful determinant of cross-country variations 
                                                 
14 Wright (1986) also formalises the issue of unemployment benefits that vary with the duration of the spell, but 
only for homogeneous risks of unemployment. 
15 Powell (2012) makes a similar point when analysing the preferences for active labour market policies. 
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in UI arrangements; more importantly, we show that risk heterogeneity not only shapes the 
size, but also the design of the unemployment insurance. 
 
4. The model 
In this section, we present successively two possible formalisations for UI. The first model 
addresses the question of the overall UI generosity. It shows that overall generosity depends 
primarily on two factors, namely the unemployment rate at country level and the dispersion 
(or heterogeneity) in unemployment risks. The second model introduces a compensation 
mechanism where benefits might decline with the duration of the unemployment spell. It also 
divides one’s unemployment risk into her probability of job loss and her probability of 
remaining unemployed (employability), as the duration of the spell will only depends on the 
latter. It shows that the country level demand for degressivity increases with the heterogeneity 
in the ratio of long- to short-term individual unemployment risks in a median voter 
framework. 
 
4.1. A simple model of UI with uniform compensation 
There is a continuum of 𝑁 = 1 agents in society. At any given time t, each agent may be 
either employed (state 𝐸𝑡, with probability (1 − 𝜃𝑖)) or unemployed (state 𝐶𝑡, with probability 
𝜃𝑖). An employed individual earns an income 𝑤𝑖 (with probability density function g) and is 
subject to a proportional social contribution c.16As a large majority of UI schemes are wage-
related, we consider that an unemployed individual gets a benefit 𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖 proportional to its 
potential labour market income.17 𝛼 is a parameter representing the budget constraint and 𝛼𝑐 
is the gross replacement rate, measuring the relative generosity of the UI. 
                                                 
16 A payroll tax earmarked to unemployment insurance. 
17 Casammatta et al. (2000) discuss the incidence of the social insurance design on general welfare, opposing 
Bismarckian earnings-related benefits to Beveridgean flat-rate benefits. In particular they show that in a 
constitutional stage, a utilitarian social planner will implement a (partly) earnings-related design to ensure 
broader support for redistribution in the voting stage. Brockhoff et al. (2012) show that this might not hold if 
Bismarckian social insurance is organised within occupational groups; the Bismarckian system is then always 
dominated by the Beveridgean one when a utilitarian criterion or majority rule applies. Nevertheless, this 
corporatist feature is less relevant in the case of UI as most national systems provide unified unemployment 
benefits for all occupations, thus a Bismarckian system could still be chosen by a social planner. 
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We do not consider incentive effects in this model as we focus on the redistributive effects of 
the UI. Thus the distribution of 𝜃 in the population (given by the probability density function 
f(.)) is exogenous and is not influenced by the level of UI generosity. We further assume that 
the distribution of income and the distribution of risks are independent to simplify 
calculations and the presentation of our results. Anyway, this assumption should not 
substantially affect our main conclusions in a UI scheme where benefits are strictly earnings-
related. Indeed, such a system achieves horizontal redistribution from individuals with low 
risk of income loss toward individuals with high risk of income loss, but only limited vertical 
redistribution from high toward low incomes (Wright, 1986). As a result, we expect 
preferences to predominantly depend on the individual unemployment risk, rather than on her 
income18. 
Equalising revenues and expenditures, the budget constraint imposes: 
�(1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑖 = �𝜃𝑖𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑖 
After simplification, this yields to: 
𝛼 = 𝑤� − ?̅?𝑤�
?̅?𝑤�
= 1 − ?̅?
?̅?
 , 
where 𝑤� = ∫𝑤𝑖𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝑤𝑖 is the average income and ?̅? = ∫𝜃𝑖𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖 is the average time 
spent in unemployment. 
a) Individual preferences 
Agents vote for the contribution rate c that simultaneously determines the overall level of UI 
expenditures and the replacement rate. If we ignore time discounting, each individual then 
maximises the following welfare function19: 
𝑉 = (1 − 𝜃𝑖) u�(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖� + 𝜃𝑖 u(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖)  
First- and second-order conditions are: 
                                                 
18 In addition, taking into account a negative correlation between unemployment risk and income would relax the 
budget constraint, as employed individuals would have above-average income and pay more taxes while 
unemployed would have below-average income and receive fewer benefits. 
19 The absence of time discounting implies that our agents are maximising their lifetime utility regardless of their 
present state (employed or not). Including time discount does not substantially modify our results. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.27
 14 
 
−(1 − 𝜃𝑖) u ′�(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖�𝑤𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 u ′(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖)𝛼𝑤𝑖 = 0 (1 − 𝜃𝑖) u ′′�(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖�𝑤𝑖2 + 𝜃𝑖 u ′′(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖)(𝛼𝑤𝑖)² < 0 
This last condition is always satisfied when u is increasing and strictly concave. In the 
following, we specify u(𝑥) = ln (𝑥). Such a utility function corresponds to a constant relative 
risk aversion (RRA) equal to 120. This implies that preferences are single-peaked and a 
majority voting equilibrium always exists in a median voter framework (Downs, 1957). First-
order condition then gives: 
𝑐𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖 
Thus individuals with higher risk of unemployment want to increase the contribution rate. 
They also want greater generosity, as measured by the replacement rate. The desired (gross) 
replacement rate21 is given by: 
𝛼𝑐𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖 1 − ?̅??̅?  
For a given distribution of unemployment risk, individuals with a higher risk of 
unemployment want a higher replacement rate. At the same time one’s preferred degree of UI 
generosity depends negatively on the average risk of unemployment (the second 
multiplicative term in the replacement rate equation decreases with ?̅?). This is a mechanical 
implication of the budget constraint; on the one hand, UI budget has to be shared among a 
higher number of beneficiaries when average unemployment rises; on the other hand, there 
are less people in employment so the fiscal basis is also smaller. 
 
 
                                                 
20 For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider utility functions with constant RRA superior to 1, while this 
restriction does not alter our main conclusions. Besides, whereas such functions are often mobilised in the 
literature (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Casamatta et al., 2000), they are less realistic in the case of social 
insurance when vertical distribution across incomes is involved (which is not the case in our model). For a given 
risk of income loss, they imply that richer individuals may demand more welfare expenditures (because the 
insurance motive dominates the redistribution motive); Iversen and Soskice (2001) present empirical evidence 
that contradicts this point. 
21 For presentation purposes, we analyse the effects of risk distribution on the gross replacement rate in this 
section, while we use net replacement rates in our empirics. This is unproblematic; the same conclusions apply to 
the preferred net rate (given by 𝜃𝑖
1−𝜃𝑖
1−𝜃�
𝜃�
), as it similarly increases with the individual unemployment risk.  
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b) Political resolution 
We now turn to the political resolution of this model in a majority voting framework. From 
above we know the agent with median preferences to be the decisive voter. Because the 
replacement rate is increasing with the individual risk 𝜃𝑖, the decisive voter is also the agent 
with the median risk of unemployment. In the following we will assume that the distribution 
of unemployment risk is skewed to the right and therefore that the median risk is below 
average (𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑 < ?̅?). This assumption denotes the fact that the risk of unemployment is overly 
concentrated on some workers22. 
Proposition 1 
• A proportional increase in the unemployment risk of all agents leads to a decrease in 
the level of UI generosity. 
Proof: let us suppose that all risks are multiplied by a constant 𝑘 > 1. The preferred 
replacement rate of the median then becomes: 
𝛼𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑑
∗ = 𝑘𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑 1 − 𝑘?̅?𝑘?̅? = 𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑 1 − 𝑘?̅??̅? < 𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑 1 − ?̅??̅?  
This result indicates that the rise in the collective cost of unemployment outweighs the rise in 
revenues induced by the higher contribution rate asked by the median voter, so that the 
previous level of UI generosity can no longer be guaranteed. Note that all agents demand a 
lower replacement rate after a proportional shock on the unemployment risk distribution: 
budget constraint issues tend to dominate the desire to insure against income loss. 
Proposition 2 
• Under majority rule, a mean preserving spread (MPS) of the unemployment risk 
distribution implies a fall in the chosen replacement rate. 
                                                 
22 This assumption shares similarities with Meltzer and Richard (1981), who exploit the right-skewed 
distribution of incomes. Brockhoff et al. (2012) present some empirical evidence about the fact that median 
unemployment duration is below-average in most OECD countries. We also find the median occupational risk to 
be below-average for most of the countries we use in our empirical analysis. Anyway, this assumption still 
makes sense for a distribution of risks (slightly) left-skewed. There is indeed a much lower turnout rate among 
low income citizens (Anderson, 2008), a similar assumption is plausible for workers with high unemployment 
risk; hence the median voter should still have a below-average risk in this case. In the same line of reasoning, we 
can also expect political actors (unions for instance) to have preferences biased toward workers in stable 
employment.  
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Proof: the preferred replacement rate of the decisive voter can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛼𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑑
∗ = 𝑟𝜃(1 − ?̅?)  
where 𝑟𝜃 = 𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑𝜃�  is a ratio depicting the relative distance between the median and the average 
unemployment risk. This ratio declines with a MPS, thus the median decisive voter will 
choose a smaller replacement rate as risk inequality increases. 
 
4.2. Multidimensional unemployment risk and UI degressivity 
a) Introducing differentiated benefits for long-term unemployed 
We now incorporate the fact that unemployment benefits may differ after the first period of 
the unemployment spell. We therefore need to take the duration of the unemployment spell 
into account. Agents’ lifetime risk of unemployment can be newly expressed as: 
𝜃𝑖 = ℎ(𝜑𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖), 
where 𝜑𝑖 represents the probability of losing one’s job and 𝛾𝑖 the probability of remaining 
unemployed23. Figure 1.4 displays a probability tree that summarises labour market 
transitions of our model. We can compute the probability for worker i of being in each state, 
now distinguishing between short-term unemployment 𝐶𝐶𝑇 (first period) and long-term 
unemployment 𝐶𝐿𝑇 (more than one period). 
𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜑𝑖)𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝑡−1) + (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡−1𝐶𝑇 ) + 𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡−1𝐿𝑇 )) 
𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑇) = 𝜑𝑖𝑃𝑖(𝐸𝑡−1) 
𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡𝐿𝑇) = 𝛾𝑖(𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡−1𝐶𝑇 ) + 𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑡−1𝐿𝑇 )) 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 (1 − 𝜑𝑖) then represents the individual’s employment stability, while (1 − 𝛾𝑖) represents her employability. 
Alternatively, one can think of 𝜑𝑖 as a measure of the frequency of unemployment spells, while 𝛾𝑖 measures the 
duration of these spells. 
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Figure 1.4:  Probability tree of labour market transitions 
 
At steady state the unemployment rate for a given class of risk (𝜑𝑖,𝛾𝑖) is constant across 
periods. From this we can infer the instant share of short- and long-term unemployed for a 
given class of risk (or equivalently the proportion of time spent in each state over the lifetime 
of an agent): 
1 − 𝜃𝑖 ≡ 𝑃𝑖(𝐸) = (1 − 𝛾𝑖)(1 − 𝛾𝑖) + 𝜑𝑖 
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 ≡ 𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑇) = 𝜑𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝑖)(1 − 𝛾𝑖) + 𝜑𝑖 
𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇 ≡ 𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝐿𝑇) = 𝜑𝑖𝛾𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝑖) + 𝜑𝑖 , 
with 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇 (respectively 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇) having a probability density function noted 𝑓𝐶𝑇 (respectively 
𝑓𝐿𝑇). 
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Each employed individual still pays social contribution 𝑐𝑤𝑖 to finance unemployment benefits 
and receives 𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖 during her first period of unemployment. However this replacement rate is 
now discounted by a factor 𝛽 for all subsequent periods of her unemployment spell. Hence, 𝛽 
measures the equality of treatment between short- and long-term unemployed: the greater the 
𝛽, the smaller the degressivity of the system. The new budget constraint imposes: 
�(1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑖 = �𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑓𝐶𝑇�𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇�𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝑑𝑤𝑖 +�𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝛼𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑓𝐿𝑇(𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇)𝑔(𝑤𝑖)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝑑𝑤𝑖 
After simplification, we get: 
𝛼 = 1 − ?̅?
𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇����� , 
where 𝜃𝐶𝑇����� = ∫𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝑓�𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇�𝑑𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇 and 𝜃𝐿𝑇����� = ∫𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝑓(𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇)𝑑𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇. Note that 𝛼 depends 
negatively on 𝛽, suggesting a trade-off between the respective generosity of short- and long-
term unemployment benefits. 
b) Individual preferences 
Each individual now has the following objective function: 
𝑉 = (1 − 𝜃𝑖) ln�(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖� + 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇 ln(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖) + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 ln(𝛽𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖)  
In this model, individuals vote simultaneously for the contribution rate c that determines the 
UI budget and for the degressivity factor 𝛽 that determines the balance between short- and 
long-term benefits. Maximising the welfare function of an agent i with respect to the 
contribution rate gives us24: 
𝑐𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜑𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝑖) + 𝜑𝑖 
Thus, the preferred contribution rate depends solely on the individual unemployment risk 𝜃𝑖 
and does not depend on the discount factor 𝛽. As a result, it entirely determines the overall 
budget for UI, regardless of the allocation between short- and long-term benefits. Moreover, 
                                                 
24 See Appendix 1.2 for details on the calculation of the first- and second-order conditions. 
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this means that there is no strategic voting taking place, in the eventuality where we would 
have different decisive voter in each ballot. 
Turning now to the preferences for degressivity, from first-order condition we get after 
simplification: 
𝛽𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 ∗
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
= 𝛾𝑖1 − 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
The preferred discount factor does not depend on c either; this parameter only determines the 
trade-off between short- and long-term benefits for a given UI budget. Moreover, this implies 
that there is no strategic voting taking place, because the outcome of one ballot does not alter 
the preferences for the outcome of the other ballot. 
The individual risk of staying unemployed shapes the preferences for degressivity.  Budget 
constraint issues also impact the preferred degree of degressivity, in a similar fashion as in the 
preferred replacement rate from the simplified model (see above). The larger the proportion of 
long-term unemployed compared to short-term unemployed in the society, the smaller the 𝛽 
and the bigger the degressivity25. 
Proposition 3 
• At the country level, heterogeneous preferences for degressivity arise from the 
heterogeneity in employability only. 
• For a given distribution of unemployment risks, workers with a higher employability 
demand a stronger degressivity. 
Proof: the first assertion is straightforward, as preferences for long-term benefits solely 
depend on the probability of remaining unemployed 𝛾𝑖 (and not on 𝜑𝑖). If all individuals have 
the same 𝛾𝑖, then their preferences will only depend on the ratio 
𝜃𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 common to all agents. 
This ratio might vary from one country to another, for different distribution of 𝜑𝑖 in the 
population. 
                                                 
25 Note that this ratio does not solely depend on the average risk of staying unemployed after job loss, but also on 
how this risk is distributed among workers. In particular, countries where workers accumulate both types of risk 
(job loss and difficulty to find a new job) will exhibit a smaller ratio of short- to long-term unemployment than 
countries where these risks are spread differently among workers. See Appendix 1.3 for a formal proof of this 
point. 
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Furthermore, by differentiating we get: 
𝑑𝛽𝑖
∗
𝑑𝛾𝑖
= 1(1 − 𝛾𝑖)2   ∗  𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� > 0 
Thus the preferred discount factor 𝛽 increases with 𝛾𝑖; for a given distribution of risks in the 
society, individuals facing high difficulties to get a new job after a dismissal are less 
supportive of degressivity. Note that this is not necessarily the case that these individuals have 
a higher absolute risk of long-term unemployment 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇, as this risk also positively depends on 
the individual job loss rate 𝜑𝑖. What matters here is the risk of long-term unemployment 
relative to the risk of short-term unemployment. 
Proposition 4 
• A decrease in the employability of any group of agents increases the demand for 
degressivity of all other agents. 
This result is also straightforward. It arises from the fact that a decrease of the employability 
of a group of agents (larger 𝛾 for this group) will negatively affect the ratio 𝜃
𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 that intervenes 
in the demand for degressivity of all agents. 
Proof: let us assume that a group of agents j experience a positive shift in their probability of 
remaining unemployed. This can be formalised by the fact that the new distribution of 𝛾 has 
first-order stochastic dominance over the old distribution, i.e. for 𝐹(. ) and 𝐹′(. ) the 
cumulative distribution functions of the old and the new distribution of 𝛾 respectively, we 
have: 
𝐹′(𝛾) ≤ 𝐹(𝛾)     ∀𝛾 
With a strict inequality at some values of 𝛾. 
Besides, we know by differentiation that the short-term unemployment risk of an individual 
decreases with her probability of remaining unemployed: 
𝑑𝜃𝑗
𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝛾𝑗
= −𝜑𝑗²
��1 − 𝛾𝑗� + 𝜑𝑗� ² < 0 
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As a consequence, the shift in the probability of remaining unemployed experienced by this 
group of agents will also affect the distribution of 𝜃𝐶𝑇. Formally, the old distribution of 𝜃𝐶𝑇 
will have first-order stochastic dominance over the new distribution. Indeed, for 𝐺(. ) and 
𝐺′(. ) the cumulative distribution functions of the old and the new distribution of 𝜃𝐶𝑇 
respectively, we necessarily have: 
𝐺′(𝜃𝐶𝑇) ≥ 𝐺(𝜃𝐶𝑇)     ∀𝜃𝐶𝑇 
With a strict inequality at some values of 𝜃𝐶𝑇. An important implication of first-order 
stochastic dominance is that the expected value 𝜃𝐶𝑇 of the new distribution will 
unambiguously be smaller. 
Similarly, the long-term unemployment risk of an individual increases with her probability of 
remaining unemployed: 
𝑑𝜃𝑗
𝐿𝑇
𝑑𝛾𝑗
= 𝜑𝑗(1 + 𝜑𝑗)
��1 − 𝛾𝑗� + 𝜑𝑗� ² > 0 
And the shift in the probability of remaining unemployed experienced by this group of agents 
will also affect the distribution of 𝜃𝐿𝑇. Applying the same line of reasoning as before, we 
know that the expected value 𝜃𝐿𝑇 will unambiguously become larger, and eventually the ratio 
𝜃𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 will fall. 
Recall that the preferred level of degressivity of the individual i is given by: 
𝛽𝑖
∗ = 𝛾𝑖1 − 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
Thus, by increasing the cost of long-term compensation the shift in 𝛾𝑗 will lower the preferred 
level of 𝛽 for all agents 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (higher degressivity). Note that the effect for the group of agents 
j is ambiguous, as the increase in their preferred 𝛽 induced by the rise in their individual 
probability of remaining unemployed might be offset by the fall in the 𝜃
𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 ratio. 
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c) Political resolution 
Proposition 5 
• Under majority rule, the chosen level of degressivity increases with the heterogeneity 
in employability. 
Proof: the preferred level of degressivity of the decisive voter can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑑
∗ = �𝜃𝐿𝑇
𝜃𝐶𝑇
�
𝑚𝑒𝑑
∗
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
= � 𝛾1 − 𝛾�𝑚𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� = 𝛾𝑚𝑒𝑑1 − 𝛾𝑚𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
Because agents differ in their preferences for degressivity according to their parameter 𝛾𝑖 
only, preferences are single-peaked and a majority voting equilibrium exists. In a similar 
fashion as for replacement rate, we expect the relative distance between the median and the 
average ratio of long- to short-term unemployment risks to determine the chosen degree of 
degressivity. We have to make here two additional assumptions about the distribution of 
employability (alternatively the distribution of 𝛾𝑖). First, we assume that the median level of 
employability is above average because the distribution of employability is skewed to the left 
by very low-employable agents. Second, we assume that differences in employability 
distributions are determined by how badly off these low-employable agents are. In particular, 
we assume that a rise in the distribution heterogeneity corresponds to a downward shift of the 
employability of agents that were already below the median. While this shift will lead to a fall 
in the 𝜃
𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 ratio (see Proposition 4), the median level of employability will not be affected. 
Thus the level of degressivity chosen by the decisive voter will increase (smaller 𝛽). 
 
5. Empirics 
This section presents empirical evidence for some of the predictions of the model presented 
above, using cross-country data. We mainly test its macroeconomic implications, namely the 
expected relations between the distribution of risks at the country level and the UI parameters 
(generosity and degressivity) that are actually observed. 
Regarding the overall level of unemployment benefits compensation, our model predicts that 
both unemployment rate and risk heterogeneity will have a negative impact on its generosity 
(Proposition 2). Our results are in line with these predictions. In particular, we find strong 
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evidence that UI generosity decreases with risk heterogeneity. This result corroborates the 
central finding from Rehm (2011), while we use a larger sample here. Moreover, regression 
results indicate that the level of unemployment negatively affects the generosity, although the 
evidence is weaker. 
Drawing on our model, we also expect degressivity to depend positively on the heterogeneity 
in the probability of remaining unemployed, or equivalently on the heterogeneity in 
employability (Proposition 5). Due to data limitations, we cannot directly test this prediction. 
Still, we find countries with a high share of low-employable workers (workers with skills that 
are specific and not easily transferable) to have more degressive UI schemes. Making the 
assumption that this will only marginally affect the employability of the decisive voter, it 
implies that those countries also exhibit larger heterogeneity in employability. Therefore, this 
result appears to be consistent with our model. 
 
5.1. Empirical strategy 
a) Unemployment benefits generosity 
From the two-period compensation model, the replacement rate chosen by the decisive 
median voter is given by the following formula: 
�𝛼𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛼𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇������𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑑∗ = 𝑟𝜃(1 − ?̅?) , 
where 𝛼𝑐 and 𝛼𝛽𝑐 are the replacement rates for short- and long-term compensation 
respectively. Hence, our model predicts that the weighted average replacement rate will 
decrease with unemployment risk heterogeneity, defined as the ratio 𝑟𝜃 = 𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑𝜃� , for a given 
level of unemployment. Conversely, it will decrease with the average level of unemployment 
for a given heterogeneity of risks.  
After log-linearisation, the estimated relation becomes: 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 𝛿1 ∗ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where all variables are expressed in logarithm. The left-hand side term is the overall 
generosity index defined above, which is the weighted average of the net replacement rates for 
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short- and long-term compensation26. In the right-hand side, a Gini index for unemployment 
risk is used as a proxy for risk heterogeneity, where unemployment risk is defined at the 
occupational level (using the 9 major groups of the ISCO classification). This measure has the 
advantage over other measures of heterogeneity that it is not sensitive to a general and 
proportional increase in the unemployment risk, while it is likely to reflect any variation in the 
𝑟𝜃 ratio. The right-hand side also includes the average unemployment level, which represents 
the economic costs for the UI system induced by the share of unemployed. In line with our 
predictions, we expect the generosity index to negatively depend on the Gini index and the 
unemployment rate. We also introduce controls in some regressions to check for other 
possible determinants of benefits generosity. 
b) Degressivity 
According to our model, the level of degressivity preferred by the decisive median voter is: 
𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑑
∗ = �𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑𝐿𝑇𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑇 �
�
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
�
= 𝛾𝑚𝑒𝑑1 − 𝛾𝑚𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
We thus expect the relative distance between the median and the average ratio of long- to 
short-term unemployment risks to determine the chosen degree of degressivity. Because we 
assume that the median level of employability will be above average, the median ratio of 
long- to short-term unemployment should be above average as well, and the degressivity 
should increase (smaller 𝛽)  with the heterogeneity in employability. Unfortunately, there is 
no data available about the respective share of short- and long-term unemployment at the 
occupational level, so that it is impossible to build a direct measure of the heterogeneity in 
employability. Instead, we chose to use the skill specificity index developed by Cusack et al. 
(2006). This index supposedly measures the extent to which workers can transfer their skill 
assets from one job to another, within the same ISCO major occupation27. It is thus a valid 
proxy for employability, as we expect individuals endowed with very specific skills to have 
difficulties to find a new job if they are made redundant, as there are only a few firms 
demanding this type of skills. Building on this index, we define two measures of 
heterogeneity in employability and we use them alternatively in our regressions:  
                                                 
26 See Appendix 1.1 for more details. 
27 See Appendix 1.1 for the description of this index. 
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-the share of workers with very specific skills in the labour force. This corresponds to the 
share of workers in ISCO major groups 7, 8 and 9, which have the highest score for the 
specificity index. 
 -a general score of skill specificity by country. We compute this variable by weighting the 
share of each ISCO major group by its specificity index. 
We argue that these variables not only measure the absolute level of employability in one 
given country but also the heterogeneity in employability, because we assume that workers 
with specific skills constitute the low-end tale of the employability distribution. Consequently, 
the bigger the share of specific skilled workers (and correlatively the higher the specific skill 
index of the country), the more heterogeneous the employability distribution and the distance 
of the median to the mean ratio of long- to short term unemployment. 
This leads us to estimate the following relation (all variables are log-transformed): 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 = 𝛿1 ∗ 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑜𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where the dependent variable is the ratio between the long- and short-term replacement rate. 
This implies that countries with a low degressivity index are very degressive; conversely 
countries with a high degressivity index maintain the same level of compensation for long-
term unemployed. We expect our degressivity index to be negatively related with our measure 
of heterogeneity in employability, alternatively with the share of specific skilled workers in 
the population and the general score of skill specificity. Because we fear that our measures of 
heterogeneity in employability are not accurate, we also include in some regressions the 
average ratio of short- to long-term unemployment 𝜃
𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 that might also possibly capture part of 
the heterogeneity. The expectation is that countries with a high average ratio will tend to 
exhibit low degressivity (high degressivity index 𝛽). 
5.2. Data and methodology 
a) Data and main variables 
Statistics for net UI replacement rates28 in industrialised countries are made available by the 
OECD for every year since 200129. Our generosity index is the average of short-term (first 
                                                 
28 Net means here post-tax, but excludes assistance and housing benefit provisions. 
29 Estimators are computed according to the legislation and do not take coverage into account. 
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year) and long-term (four subsequent years) replacement rates, weighted by the relative share 
of long-term and short term unemployment at the country level. Our degressivity index is the 
ratio between long-term and short-term replacement rates. In both cases, following OECD 
methodology, replacement rates are computed as the average compensation for eight different 
household types (varying in their income and their number of adults and children) 30. Note 
that since replacement rates for long-term compensation data are only available as the average 
compensation for a five-year unemployment spell, our measures of generosity and 
degressivity might overestimate the role of very long-term compensation. Indeed, the 
replacement rates for the second and the fifth year of unemployment have the same weight in 
the index, whereas the number of people staying unemployed for five consecutive years 
should be marginal. Also, these data do not allow us to disentangle between scheme with a 
strong degressivity at the beginning of the unemployment spell and scheme with a smooth 
degressivity all along the five years of unemployment. However in spite of these 
imperfections, these data provide precious information on cross-country variations in the 
design of UI schemes. 
For our measure of unemployment risk we use data from the ILO database, which provides 
information about unemployment rates for nine broad classes of occupations based on the 
international ISCO typology, and also gives their respective share in total employment. We 
use a Gini index based on the unemployment risk at the occupational level to measure risk 
heterogeneity31. The rationale behind this empirical strategy is that the occupation is one of 
the main determinants of an individual’s employment opportunities. Contrary to other 
workers’ characteristics (the economic sector for instance), there is indeed a low mobility 
between occupations, as they are based on qualifications and skills that are difficult to 
acquire.  
As stated above, there is unfortunately no indication about the average duration of the 
unemployment spells per occupation, so that we cannot calculate the relative share of long-
term unemployment for each occupation. Still, the OECD provides information about the 
relative share of long-term unemployment at the country level, which corresponds to 
unemployment spells longer than 12 months, which allows us to compute the average ratio of 
short-to long term unemployment. 
                                                 
30 More details are available in Appendix 1.1. 
31 See Rehm (2011) for a similar empirical strategy. 
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b) Methodology 
Our sample includes 155 observations on 24 OECD countries and 1 to 8 observations by 
country (6.5 on average). We use two different specifications in our regressions. We first run 
simple OLS regressions using country averages over the whole period, so that we end up with 
one observation per country. Average variables are computed on all available data by country. 
This method allows a reliable cross-country comparison and has the advantage to exclude 
usual time-series issues (auto-correlation, suspicion of non-stationarity). However, the small 
number of observations does not allow the addition of many covariates as controls. This is 
why we only introduce our controls one at a time. 
A second specification uses the Panel-Corrected-Standard-Error methodology (PCSE): it 
allows us to exploit the Time-Series-Cross-Section structure of our data and to include several 
observations per country into the sample. The advantage is to increase the variance of 
dependent and explanatory variables as we also exploit within-country variation. Since the 
number of observations for each country varies a lot, we use weighted observations that give 
the same importance to each country to make sure that the results are not driven by outliers. 
PCSE regressions include Prais-Winsten transformation to allow for an autocorrelation of 
order 1 (with a common autocorrelation coefficient for all countries). However, our variables 
of interest are highly persistent; this is especially true for the institutional dependent variables, 
but also for some of our covariates, so that we observe a high degree of auto-correlation that 
might bias our results. Moreover, it is likely that the response to shocks in the explanatory 
variables will be delayed32. Thus, the short window of observation (8 subsequent years at 
most) does not allow us to add significant within-country variation that would improve the 
accuracy of our estimates. Consequently, we only present the estimates from the PCSE 
specification as a robustness check for the results obtained in OLS, and will not give them too 
much credit in their interpretation. 
Other robustness checks include jackknife post-estimations, where observations (or countries 
in the case of PCSE) are dropped one at a time (results are not displayed) to exclude the 
possibility of outlier-driven results. We have also run an OLS estimation with another 
measure of degressivity provided by the OECD that details the replacement rate for the first 
five years of the unemployment spell; unfortunately this information is only available for the 
                                                 
32 The intuition here is that it might take a couple of years for the political actors to convey the new set 
preferences induced by this shock. 
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year 2007, this is why we use the data on degressivity described above for our main 
regressions. Finally, we use quantile regressions to test whether the obtained results are not 
simply imputable to an average effect. 
c) Controls 
We include several controls in our regressions to check the explanatory power of our main 
independent variables. These controls account for various aspects of the economic and 
institutional context at the country level that are commonly regarded as potential determinants 
of social protection generosity33. They include the level of income inequality measured by a 
Gini index of the pre-tax income. Indeed, some authors (Kim, 2007) suggest that income 
inequality might negatively affect UI generosity, particularly in the case where unemployment 
is negatively correlated with income at the individual level; while we acknowledge this 
possibility, we argue that the relationship with unemployment heterogeneity should be 
stronger. 
We also introduce the level of economic development, using a measure of GDP per capita. 
According to the so-called "Wagner law" that describes social protection as a superior good, 
one could expect UI to be more developed in richer countries. This would also be the case if 
relative risk aversion is higher than one at the micro level, as richer agents would dedicate a 
higher share of their income to social insurance purposes. In PCSE regressions, this control 
might also account for economic cycles. 
Another control is a measure of trade openness, using a ratio of the share of international trade 
(import and export) over GDP. The intuition here is that trade openness may increase 
unemployment risk in sectors that are opened to international competition. While it should 
enhance the demand for insurance from the individuals working in these sectors, it should also 
increase risk heterogeneity. The global effect on UI generosity and degressivity would 
therefore be ambiguous.  
Furthermore, we use the level of labour market regulation measured by the Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) index for standard jobs. Basically, EPL supposedly reduces job-
loss risk but also job opportunities for unemployed, and there is a possible complementarity 
between EPL and the generosity of unemployment benefits (as suggested by Amable, 2009). 
                                                 
33 All of these controls are provided by the OECD. Note that because of the lack of yearly data, we have to use 
the country-averaged Gini of income in PCSE specifications also. 
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Indeed, EPL might homogenise the risk distribution and thus foster generous unemployment 
benefits and low degressivity. 
Finally, we also control for the level of deficit spending, as one could expect UI generosity to 
be low when there are no room for manoeuvre in public finances.  
 
5.3. Results 
a) Unemployment benefits generosity 
Figure 1.5 displays the strong negative relationship between short-term replacement rate and 
occupational unemployment risk heterogeneity, where all values are country-averaged. This is 
a replication of Rehm (2011), reassessed here on a broader observation window and a larger 
set of countries.  
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Figure 1.1 :  Short term replacement rate and unemployment inequality 
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Table 1.2 : OLS Regression on average values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Short-term 
replacement rate  
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
average 
generosity index 
Average Gini of 
unemployment 
-262.6*** -358.3*** -294.6** -322.8** -254.0** -367.4*** -381.7*** -284.8** 
 (-4.37) (-4.00) (-2.95) (-3.44) (-2.98) (-4.08) (-4.05) (-3.18) 
         
Average 
unemployment 
88.38  -109.3      
 (1.49)  (-1.34)      
         
Average Gini of 
income 
   -68.30     
    (-1.17)     
         
GDP percapita (av.)     0.000867**    
     (2.93)    
         
Average trade openness      -0.0678   
      (-1.01)   
         
Average EPL index       -0.210  
       (-0.06)  
         
Deficit (av.)        170.4* 
        (2.17) 
         
Constant 207.3*** 254.1*** 225.6*** 254.4*** 171.2** 265.3*** 268.9*** 214.1*** 
 (6.18) (4.94) (4.11) (4.99) (3.25) (5.04) (4.88) (4.20) 
Observations 29 24 24 24 24 24 22 24 
R2 0.423 0.421 0.467 0.457 0.589 0.448 0.464 0.527 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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In Table 1.2, we present the results of OLS regressions, where UI generosity is our dependent 
variable. Except for the first column, the dependent variable is always the average of short- 
and long-term replacement rates, weighted by their respective share in unemployment (see 
above). Again, the first column replicates one of Rehm’s main findings on our extended 
dataset: we also find risk heterogeneity to have a significant and negative impact on the short-
term replacement rate, while the effect of the unemployment rate is positive but not 
significant. Looking at columns 2 to 8, we test the robustness of the negative impact of risk 
heterogeneity on our generosity index, including other potential explanatory variables one at a 
time. Our main specification is in column 3, which includes both unemployment level and 
unemployment heterogeneity. As expected, we find a negative relation between the Gini 
index of unemployment risk and the generosity of unemployment insurance, which is robust 
to the inclusion of various controls. This relation is significant in all of our specifications at 
the 1% level (or smaller levels). Results for the effect of the unemployment level on our 
generosity index are less conclusive (column 3). While its estimate has a negative sign as 
expected (and contrary to Rehm), it fails to achieve significance. From the included controls, 
we only find the GDP per capita and the public deficit to have a significant impact on the 
generosity index, while risk heterogeneity remains significant. The sign for public deficit is 
not the one expected, but one might suspect endogeneity issues to bias this estimate, as a 
generous UI might also impact public deficits. 
Table 1.3 displays the results for regressions on our weighted generosity index, using PCSE. 
We notably introduce our controls altogether (column 4). These results must be interpreted 
cautiously; the auto-correlation of our variables is very high due to their strong persistence 
(especially for the dependent variable). This explains the amplitude of the R squared statistics, 
which are always higher than 0.88. Still, we find the Gini index of unemployment risk to be 
negative and significant with or without the inclusion of controls at the 0.1% level. The 
estimates coefficients are weaker than in simple OLS, but this is probably due to the use of a 
model with auto-correlation34. The unemployment rate eventually turns out to be significant 
(column 2 and 4), but as argued above no general conclusion can be drawn on this point as 
this effect is not robust to simple OLS. 
 
                                                 
34 A share of the effect of the explanatory variable is captured by the auto-correlated term of error. 
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Table 1.3: OLS regression on Panel Data with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 generosity 
index 
generosity 
index 
generosity 
index 
generosity 
index 
Gini of 
unemployment 
-154.4*** -137.7*** -127.9*** -107.3*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.89) (-4.64) (-4.52) 
     
Unemployment  -64.97*  -45.63+ 
  (-2.31)  (-1.86) 
     
GDP per capita   0.000548*** 0.000394** 
   (4.57) (3.04) 
     
Trade openness    -0.156*** 
    (-4.64) 
     
EPL index    7.510*** 
    (7.48) 
     
Deficit    15.08 
    (0.83) 
     
Gini of income 
(av.) 
   -144.3*** 
    (-4.45) 
     
Constant 135.3*** 130.7*** 105.7*** 141.2*** 
 (7.66) (8.06) (6.78) (7.56) 
Observations 155 155 155 149 
R2 0.884 0.884 0.892 0.940 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Turning to controls estimates, we only find GDP per capita to be significant in both 
specifications, supporting the idea that UI is a superior good. As other controls turns out to be 
significant in PCSE regressions only, we do not want to interpret them furthermore (except 
for the public deficit, the signs correspond to our expectations).  
b) Degressivity 
Figure 1.6 displays the relationship between the degressivity index and the general score for 
skill specificity defined above. As expected, the trend is negative: countries with a higher 
share of workers with specific skills also generally have a more degressive UI system (smaller 
degressivity index). While the graph reveals several outliers (Switzerland, Canada, Israel, 
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Korea35, Italy36, and Greece), the relationship is not as clear cut as for Figure 1.5. It is not 
obvious whether this should be ascribed to the (relative) weakness of the relationship, or to 
the fact that we use a rather rough proxy for the heterogeneity in employability. 
Figure 1.2: Degressivity index and skill specificity (average by country) 
 
Still, we find this proxy to perform rather well in our regressions. Table 1.4 displays the 
results of the OLS regressions for our degressivity index. We use alternatively two proxies for 
the heterogeneity in employability, namely the share of workers engaged in occupations 
requiring specific skills (column 1) and the average score of skill specificity by country 
(columns 2 to 8). As expected, we find a negative relationship between the degressivity index 
and our main explanatory variables in all estimations: this means that a higher concentration 
of the labour force in specific skills occupations is associated with less degressive 
unemployment insurance. Estimates remain significant after the inclusion of controls, except 
for column 7 where GDP per capita is added as a covariate. This probably stems from the fact 
that the specificity score and GDP per capita are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 
                                                 
35 There is a legitimate concern about the accuracy of data for Korea, since they claim to have no more than 2% 
of long-term unemployed among all unemployed. 
36 Italy is a specific case: unemployment insurance is almost inexistent but redundancy payments are very high. 
If one considers Italian redundancy payments as a form of unemployment compensation, short-term replacement 
rate should be considerably higher. In turn, we would have a higher degressivity index than we do by solely 
focusing on the unemployment insurance. 
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0.81). Indeed, there is probably a bias in the measure of specificity toward countries with a 
large industrial sector, as occupations attached to this sector are ranked as highly specific by 
the index of Cusack et al. (2006), whereas these countries also tend to be poorer compared to 
post-industrial countries. Among other tested controls, the only one that appears to be 
(weakly) significant is the EPL index: a higher market regulation is associated with less 
degressive unemployment benefits, suggesting that EPL tend to homogenise unemployment 
duration among unemployed. Note that the average ratio of short- to long-unemployment is 
positive as expected, while it fails to achieve significance, suggesting that it is the 
heterogeneity in employability rather than its absolute level that plays a role in the 
determination of the degressivity index. 
From the PCSE specification displayed in Table 1.5, we see that our main explanatory 
variables (score of skill specificity and the alternative variable) still have negative 
coefficients, significant at the 0.1% level, with or without the introduction of controls. In 
contrast to the OLS estimation, the introduction of GDP per capita as a control does not affect 
the coefficient and the significance of our explanatory variable (column 5). Again, we remain 
cautious in the interpretation of these estimates, as the autocorrelation coefficients rhos are 
fairly high (from 0.87 to 0.92). Among our controls, only the EPL index and the Gini index of 
unemployment risk are significant. Again, we do not elaborate on this latter result because of 
the absence of significance of this variable in the OLS regression. 
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Table 1.4: OLS regressions on average values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity 
Share of ISCO groups 7, 
8, 9 in the labour force  
-3.283**        
 (-3.17)        
         
Score of skill specificity  
 
 -0.681*** -0.658* -0.771** -0.636** -1.000** -0.359 -0.737** 
  (-3.82) (-2.70) (-3.66) (-3.03) (-3.78) (-1.00) (-3.12) 
         
Average short-term/long 
term unempl ratio  
  0.00645      
   (0.23)      
         
 Gini of unemployment    1.589     
    (0.56)     
         
Average Gini of income     -2.250    
     (-1.43)    
         
Average EPL index      0.230+   
      (2.06)   
         
GDP per capitamoy       0.0000170  
       (1.12)  
         
Trade openness        0.00104 
        (0.53) 
         
Constant 1.490*** 3.471*** 3.353** 2.949 3.932*** 4.556*** 1.558 3.611** 
 (4.14) (4.25) (2.93) (1.71) (3.99) (4.28) (0.79) (3.60) 
Observations 29 29 23 22 24 22 24 24 
R2 0.272 0.350 0.349 0.414 0.382 0.430 0.360 0.331 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Table 1.5: OLS regression on Panel Data with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity 
Share of ISCO 7, 8, 9 
in the labour force 
-2.461***     
 (-5.43)     
      
Score of skill 
specificity  
 -0.587*** -0.513*** -0.548*** -0.682*** 
  (-5.94) (-4.07) (-6.20) (-5.30) 
      
GDP per capita   0.000000220  -0.00000138 
   (0.06)  (-0.47) 
      
Short-term/long-     -0.000441 -0.000330 
term unempl ratio    (-0.85) (-0.82) 
      
 Gini of income (av.)     0.0844 
     (0.12) 
      
Gini of unemployment     1.538** 
     (2.72) 
      
EPL index     0.104** 
     (3.02) 
      
Trade openness     -0.0000451 
     (-0.05) 
      
Constant 1.204*** 3.031*** 2.695*** 2.861*** 2.344*** 
 (7.18) (6.48) (4.19) (6.82) (4.44) 
Observations 165 165 157 155 150 
R2 0.507 0.547 0.561 0.614 0.618 
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
c) Robustness checks 
Results are robust to jackknife re-estimation and to cross-validation (dropping country one at 
a time) in the case of panel regression. Appendix 1.4 displays the results of OLS quantile 
regressions. These quantile regressions make us confident that our main results are not an 
artefact due to a couple of outliers. Besides, these graphs suggest a possible non-linearity in 
the relation between unemployment rate and generosity, and between the skill specificity 
score and degressivity (while this latter result could be ascribed to the inaccuracy of our proxy 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.27
 38 
 
of heterogeneity in employability). On the contrary, the relation between risk heterogeneity 
and benefit generosity appears very linear (even if some countries are clear outliers).  
In order to check that the results from the PCSE estimation are not biased, given the strong 
persistence of the dependent variables, we use an alternative method to account for some 
within-country variation: we run OLS estimations where we only keep observations for year 
2001 and 2007, using robust standard errors, for UI generosity and degressivity. This provides 
us with 39 observations (instead of 24) and supports our main conclusions. In particular, the 
score of skill specificity index again remains significant even after controlling for GDP per 
capita. 
d) Summary of empirical results 
Empirical evidence supports our model that puts unemployment risk homogeneity as a 
predominant determinant of UI generosity.  Even if this result is not entirely original, it is 
reassessed on a large set of countries and for an index of UI generosity that takes into account 
long-term compensation. On the other hand, the evidence for a negative impact of the 
unemployment rate is less conclusive. Besides, we also find empirical evidence for a negative 
relationship between degressivity and measures of heterogeneity in employability. 
However, we do not want to conclude on the substantive effect of our explanatory variables; 
the coefficients of the OLS estimates are very sensitive due to the small sample, and we 
suspect biases in the PCSE specification due to time-series issues (strong auto-correlation). 
Moreover, we also suspect possible non-linearities in the two models (generosity and 
degressivity). Eventually, we understand our evidence to be relevant at the cross-country 
level. Neither the data, nor the methodology allows us to draw any empirical conclusions at 
the within-country level.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed an interest-based political economy of unemployment 
insurance. Underlining the distributional consequences of unemployment insurance, our main 
contribution was to take into account the bi-dimensional dimension of unemployment 
insurance (short- and long-term compensation). Our formal model provides micro-economic 
foundations to the determination of UI generosity: we show that the heterogeneity in 
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unemployment risk and the level of unemployment determine this generosity. We also 
demonstrate that the political demand for degressivity can be ascribed to the unequal 
distribution of employability in the labour force. Moreover, we have presented empirical 
evidence in line with these theoretical results. Individual preferences based on self-interest 
and political mechanisms concur to shape unemployment insurance generosity, as well as the 
repartition of the benefits between short- and long-term unemployed. 
This last point is not purely theoretical and speculative: it has important practical implications 
for at least two reasons. First, the employability of a worker is not a monotonic function of her 
risk of job loss:  for instance, managers and blue-collars in the same firm may share the same 
risk of redundancy (if the firm goes bankrupt), but their expected unemployment duration 
differs due to their different level in employability. Thus, workers interests concerning 
unemployment insurance degressivity differ from their interests regarding the level of 
generosity of short-term compensation. The second reason is that for a given UI size, the 
choice of how benefits are shared between short- and long-term unemployed may have 
dramatic results on its distributional properties.  
This paper provides an analytical framework to explain cross-country variations in 
unemployment insurance generosity and design. Further research and more data would be 
required to complete it by studying the dynamic of UI reforms at the country level. Indeed, 
even if preferences for generosity and degressivity are independent at the individual level, 
there is a possible trade-off between both dimensions at the political level. Hence, one could 
imagine the possibility for a government to compensate the dissatisfaction that a reform on 
one dimension (say unemployment generosity) would brought to his clientele by manipulating 
the other dimension (degressivity). Alternatively, this could also be a mean to reach support 
from a new segment of the electorate. This mechanism would be particularly relevant in a 
context where exogenous constraints (firm opposition, labour cost in a globalised context, 
etc.) prevent from raising unemployment contributions, although a concomitant rise in 
unemployment threatens the fiscal balance of the unemployment insurance. In such a context, 
degressivity can be seen as a tool used by governments to minimise their electoral losses, by 
targeting the cuts on marginal constituencies.  
Eventually, this work has more general implications for political economy of social insurance. 
Indeed, economics of social protection have shown for long that "technical" parameters of 
social insurance may have important distributional effects (see for instance the complex 
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calculation of pension's benefits). Our work stresses that these parameters should also be 
considered as important features of the electoral “game”, as they shape the attitudes of insured 
workers toward social insurance, and can be possibly exploited by politicians to resolve social 
conflicts about the use of scarce financial resources in times of austerity. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.1 - Data and construction of variables 
- Variables on unemployment (sources: OECD and ILO) 
Unemployment rate: total unemployment rate by country, annual data, ILO database 
Unemployment rate by ISCO: annual data, ILO database, 
Unemployment of ISCO #(Employed people of ISCO # + Unemployed of ISCO#) . In some countries the unemployment rate 
computed by the weighted sum of unemployment rates by ISCO is underestimated because a 
significant number of unemployed do not declare any ISCO. We correct this ratio to ensure 
that the average unemployment computed through ISCO is equal to the actual statistic on total 
unemployment rate.  
Share of long-term unemployment: proportion of people who are unemployed for more than 
one year on the total number of unemployed, annual data, OECD.  
Long-term unemployment rate: Unemployment rate*share of long-term unemployment 
Short-term unemployment rate: Unemployment rate*(1-share of long-term unemployment) 
Gini index of unemployment rate by ISCO: This measure accounts for the unequal 
distribution of unemployment across occupation. It does not give information on the 
distribution of long- and short-term unemployment across ISCO (since we do not have the 
required data). 
- Variables on replacement rates (source: OECD): 
The replacement rate is the net replacement of unemployment insurance, housing benefit 
excluded provided by OECD. The average is computed for eight family types: single or 
married couple, without child and with two children, with earning equal to 67% and 100% of 
the average wage. 
Short-term replacement rate: average replacement rate during the first twelve months of 
unemployment.  
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.27
 45 
 
Long-term replacement rate: it is calculated as follows: 
𝐿𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = [5∗𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 60 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠]−𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
4
  
This formula allows disentangling short-term and long-term generosity by extracting the 
short-term component of the long-term replacement rate index. In some cases, this leads to 
slightly negative values for long-term replacement rates. For instance, when the actual 
duration of UI benefits is shorter than one year, our formula computes a negative long-term 
benefit replacement by overestimating the weight of short-term benefits. In that case, value 0 
is given to long-term replacement rate.  
Overall generosity index:  Average ST RR ∗ (1 − share of LT unemployment)  + Average LT RR ∗share of LT unemployment  
(RR= replacement rate) 
Whereas generosity index generally used only focuses on short-term replacement rate (e.g. 
Rehm, 2011, Scruggs, 2006) or are a not weighted average of replacement rate on five years 
of unemployment (OECD long-term net replacement rate), our overall generosity index 
includes short-term and long-term benefits, weighted by the average duration of 
unemployment in each country. This index fits better to the idea of benefits generosity of the 
model: it is a transfer from employed individuals toward unemployed, all along the 
unemployment spell. A bi-plot in appendix 1.5 shows that although correlated with short-term 
generosity index, our overall generosity index varies more across countries. Econometrics 
also shows both measures are not strictly equivalent. 
Degressivity index: Using definitions of short-term replacement rate and long-term 
replacement rate presented above it is calculated as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
This ratio takes value 1 in a non-degressive system (where UI benefits are constant over five 
years) and value 0 in very degressive systems (where UI benefits stop after one year of 
unemployment). If UI benefits duration is lower than one year, the degressivity index may be 
negative. 
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- Other variables: 
Index of skill specificity: We build the skill specificity index of each country for each year by 
computing the average of  the share of the workforce by ISCO, weighted by the relative 
specific skill index of each ISCO provided by Cusack  et al. (2006) (see Table A1.1 below).  
Share of the labour force in specific skills occupations: Share of the labour force in ISCO 
groups 7, 8 and 9, which are the occupational groups involving the most specific skills (or the 
highest specific skill index, see Table A1.1 below).  
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Table A1.1: The Skill Specificity Index by ISCO 
  
Number of 
unit groups 
within ISCO 
classification 
Share in 
ISCO 
classification Empirical share in labor force 
Absolute 
skill 
specificity 
ISCO skill-
level 
Relative 
skill 
specificity   
 (Relative 
skill 
specificity) 
/ StDv   
ISCO88 1-digit     female male total total       
1 "Legislators, senior officials and managers" 33.0 0.1 5.3 10.5 8.3 10.2 4.0 2.6 0.9 
2 "Professionals" 55.0 0.1 13.6 12.2 12.7 11.1 4.0 2.8 1.0 
3 "Technicians and associate professionals" 73.0 0.2 16.2 12.7 14.3 13.2 3.0 4.4 1.6 
4 "Clerks" 23.0 0.1 22.2 6.9 13.4 4.4 2.0 2.2 0.8 
5 "Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers" 23.0 0.1 21.4 7.6 13.4 4.4 2.0 2.2 0.8 
6 "Skilled agricultural and fishery workers" 16.0 0.0 3.0 5.4 4.4 9.3 2.0 4.7 1.7 
7 "Craft and related trades workers" 70.0 0.2 4.2 23.8 15.5 11.6 2.0 5.8 2.1 
8 "Plant and machine operators and assemblers" 70.0 0.2 3.9 12.5 8.8 20.5 2.0 10.2 3.8 
9 "Elementary occupations" 25.0 0.1 10.0 8.4 9.1 7.1 1.0 7.1 2.6 
SUM 388.0 1.0 99.9 99.9 99.9   StDV 2.7 1.0 
Source: Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Cusack et al. (2006) 
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Appendix 1.2 - Calculations of the first- and second-order conditions 
Each agent maximises: 
𝑉 = (1 − 𝜃𝑖) ln�(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖� + 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇 ln(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖) + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 ln(𝛼𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖)  
Differentiating with respect to c gives: 
−(1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑤𝑖(1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝛼𝑤𝑖𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝛼𝛽𝑤𝑖𝛼𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖  = 0 
⟺
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇
𝑐
+ 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇
𝑐
 = (1 − 𝜃𝑖)(1 − 𝑐)  
⟺ 𝑐𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖 
(with 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 = 𝜃𝑖) 
Second-order differentiation gives: 
𝑑2𝑉
𝑑𝑐2
= −(1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑤𝑖2((1 − 𝑐)𝑤𝑖)2 − 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇(𝛼𝑤𝑖)2(𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖)2 − 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇(𝛼𝛽𝑤𝑖)2(𝛼𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖)2 < 0 
Differentiating with respect to 𝛽 gives: 
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝛽 𝑐𝑤𝑖
𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖
+ 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 �𝛼𝑐𝑤𝑖 + 𝑑𝛼𝑑𝛽 𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖�
𝛼𝛽𝑐𝑤𝑖
 = 0 
⇔
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝛽
𝛼
+ 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝛼𝑑𝛽
𝛼
= −𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇
𝛽
 
⇔ �𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇� 𝑑𝛼𝑑𝛽 𝛽 = −𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝛼 
⇔ 𝛽 = − 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝜃𝑖 𝛼
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝛽
 
From: 
𝛼 = 1 − ?̅?
𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
⇒
𝑑𝛼
𝑑𝛽
= −𝛼 𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
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We get: 
𝛽 = 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇
𝜃𝑖
∗
𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
 
⇔ 𝛽𝑖
∗ = 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 ∗
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
= 𝛾𝑖1 − 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����𝜃𝐿𝑇����� 
Second-order differentiation gives: 
𝑑2𝑉
𝑑𝛽2
= 𝜃𝑖𝜃𝐿𝑇�����2
�𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝛽𝜃𝐿𝑇������2 − 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝛽2  
Introducing the preferred value of 𝛽 yields: 
𝜃𝑖𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
2
�𝜃𝐶𝑇����� + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 �
2 −
𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇
�
𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇
𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇 ∗
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
�
2 = �𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝜃𝐿𝑇������2
𝜃𝑖𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
2 −
�𝜃𝑖
𝐶𝑇𝜃𝐿𝑇������
2
𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
2  
= (𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑇 − 𝜃𝑖)�𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝜃𝐿𝑇������2
𝜃𝑖𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
2  
= −𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇�𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇𝜃𝐿𝑇������2
𝜃𝑖𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑇𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
2 < 0 
And 𝛽𝑖∗ is a maximum. 
 
Appendix 1.3 - Formal proof of the relationship between risk distribution and the 
average short- to long-term unemployment ratio 
“An increase in the probability of job loss of one agent will have a positive impact on the 
average ratio of short- to long-term unemployment if her employability is above a certain 
threshold and a negative impact if her employability is below this threshold.” 
Proof: let us assume an increase in the probability of job loss for agent j only. Differentiating 
her probability of short- and long-term unemployment yields: 
𝑑𝜃𝑗
𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= (1 − 𝛾𝑗)²
��1 − 𝛾𝑗� + 𝜑𝑗� ² > 0 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.27
 50 
 
𝑑𝜃𝑗
𝐿𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= 𝛾𝑗(1 − 𝛾𝑗)
��1 − 𝛾𝑗� + 𝜑𝑗� ² > 0 
Not surprisingly both her short- and long-term unemployment risk will increase. From 
linearity of the expected value we know that: 
𝑑𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= 𝑑(𝐸(𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑇))
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= 𝐸 �𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
� = 𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
 
𝑑𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= 𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐿𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
 
 
Looking at the effect on the average ratio of short- to long-term unemployment: 
𝑑 �
𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
�
𝑑𝜑𝑗
= 𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑇𝑑𝜑𝑗 𝜃𝐿𝑇����� − 𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐿𝑇𝑑𝜑𝑗 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
�𝜃𝐿𝑇������
2  , 
which is negative for: 
𝑑𝜃𝑗
𝐶𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
𝜃𝐿𝑇����� < 𝑑𝜃𝑗𝐿𝑇
𝑑𝜑𝑗
𝜃𝐶𝑇����� 
⟺
�1 − 𝛾𝑗�
𝛾𝑗
< 𝜃𝐶𝑇�����
𝜃𝐿𝑇�����
 , 
⟺ 𝛾𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗𝐿𝑇𝜃𝑗 > 𝜃𝐿𝑇�����?̅?  
and positive otherwise. This indicates that a deterioration in the job loss rate of a worker (or a 
group of workers) who has a higher relative share of time spent in long-term unemployment 
than the population will lead to decrease the average ratio of short- to long-term 
unemployment. Conversely, this ratio will increase if this worker tends to be relatively less 
affected by long-term unemployment than average (because she has a high employability). 
As a consequence, for two given distributions of probability of job loss 𝜑𝑖 and probability of 
staying unemployed 𝛾𝑖, the ratio 
𝜃𝐶𝑇������
𝜃𝐿𝑇������
 will be smaller in countries where the same workers 
accumulate both type of risks. This result is pretty intuitive: countries where workers with low 
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employability also have the more secure jobs will have a larger share of short-term 
unemployment in total unemployment, as unemployed would then principally consist of 
workers with high employability. 
 
Appendix 1.4 - Robustness checks 
Quantile regression of the specification of first model on average values (without controls) 
Figure A1.1: Dependent variable: Generosity index 
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Figure A1.2 : Dependent variable: degressivity index 
 
 
Table A1.2: Cross-validation of the PCSE estimates on generosity 
 
Note: Estimation of standard errors and coefficients of the main PCSE regression when dropping country one by 
one. Slovak Republic, Canada and Belgium are the main outliers but the coefficient size of our explanatory 
variable remains relatively stable. 
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149.           Belgium    25.55208   -174.6035  
                                                
147.            Canada    19.15788   -171.5991  
137.           Denmark    18.65129   -165.7181  
132.             Spain    13.93642   -177.0833  
119.           Austria    12.86317   -178.3584  
114.       New Zealand    10.50285   -180.9532  
                                                
108.           Finland    9.864478   -173.3591  
 99.            Sweden    9.623064   -170.8261  
 95.       Switzerland    8.266421   -149.0591  
 88.         Australia    8.216641   -175.3734  
 79.           Germany    6.515472   -174.2104  
                                                
 72.            Poland    5.349698   -180.5727  
 65.           Hungary     .024832   -179.1397  
 51.          Portugal   -7.613537   -177.8758  
 49.             Korea   -9.528692   -191.6648  
 40.            Greece   -10.41402   -165.6322  
                                                
 30.    United Kingdom   -12.33514   -174.7962  
 25.            Turkey   -14.88728   -164.3811  
 18.    Czech Republic   -16.34446   -168.4258  
 13.             Italy   -17.46943   -178.4214  
  8.   Slovak Republic   -19.13208   -197.8208  
                                                
               Country   erreurm~e        coef  
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Table A1.3: Replication of Table 1.3 in OLS for years 2001 and 2007 only (robust standard 
errors) 
 
Note: t statistics in parentheses.    + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A1.4: Cross-validation of the PCSE estimates on degressivity 
 
Note: Estimation of standard errors and coefficients of main PCSE regression when dropping country one by 
one. Korea and Slovak Republic are the main outliers but the coefficient size of our explanatory variable remains 
relatively stable. 
                                                
150.       New Zealand    .5136828   -.5862306  
                                                
143.    United Kingdom    .5096036   -.6721971  
135.           Austria    .4968174   -.6955525  
132.           Denmark    .4885154   -.7114779  
120.           Belgium    .4396493   -.6921055  
116.         Australia     .425117    -.693317  
                                                
104.           Germany    .3538415   -.6588966  
 97.   Slovak Republic    .2903204   -1.021273  
 93.           Finland    .2384336   -.6954567  
 84.          Portugal     .226819   -.6725225  
 79.             Spain    .1323695   -.7157453  
                                                
 67.           Hungary   -.0705951   -.6522474  
 59.            Poland   -.0789727   -.6460559  
 50.    Czech Republic   -.1528515   -.6897804  
 43.            Sweden   -.2196661   -.8103155  
 35.            Canada   -.2388615   -.6888152  
                                                
 31.            Turkey   -.3196618   -.6104143  
 23.             Italy   -.4445577    -.650359  
 15.            Greece   -.4896456   -.7967961  
  9.       Switzerland   -.5459871   -.7167875  
  7.             Korea   -1.165682   -.6061235  
                                                
               Country   erreurm~e        coef  
                                                
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Generosity index Generosity index Generosity index Generosity index 
 Gini of unemployment -371.4*** -318.9*** -301.6*** -191.6+ 
 (-5.79) (-4.21) (-4.48) (-1.99) 
     
 Unemployment   -106.7*  0.109 
  (-2.28)  (0.00) 
     
GDPpercapita   0.000709** 0.000479+ 
   (3.51) (1.72) 
     
Trade openness    -0.0272 
    (-0.31) 
     
EPL index    2.802 
    (0.88) 
     
Deficit    159.7* 
    (2.33) 
     
Gini of income (av.)    -71.32 
    (-1.14) 
     
Constant 261.8*** 239.1*** 202.2*** 162.8* 
 (7.02) (5.54) (5.03) (2.35) 
Observations 38 38 38 36 
R2 0.310 0.365 0.445 0.584 
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Table A1.5: Replication of Table 1.5 in simple OLS for years 2001 and 2007 only (robust 
standard errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity Degressivity 
Share of ISCO 7, 8, 9 
in the labour force 
-3.621***     
 (-5.21)     
      
Score of skill 
specificity  
 -0.839*** -0.847*** -0.833*** -1.234*** 
  (-6.47) (-4.02) (-6.52) (-4.06) 
      
GDP per capita   -0.00000143  -0.00000549 
   (-0.14)  (-0.54) 
      
Short-term/long term 
unempl ratio  
   -0.00364*** -0.00278* 
    (-4.61) (-2.31) 
      
 Gini of income (av.)     -0.564 
     (-0.36) 
      
Gini of 
unemployment 
    2.412 
     (0.72) 
      
EPL index     0.179+ 
     (1.71) 
      
Trade openness     0.00158 
     (1.03) 
      
Constant 1.639*** 4.201*** 4.281*** 4.214*** 4.382+ 
 (6.36) (6.89) (3.62) (6.96) (1.80) 
Observations 39 39 38 38 36 
R2 0.316 0.404 0.396 0.462 0.542 
Note: t statistics in parentheses.   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix 1.5 - Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Figure A1.3: Share of LT Unemployment over Unemployment rate 
 
Figure A1.4: Overall Generosity index and short-term generosity 
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Figure A1.5: UI Generosity and unemployment inequality 
 
Figure A1.6: Overall Generosity index and short-term generosity 
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Figure A1.7: Index of skill specificity by country 
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